We study the revenue maximization problem with an imprecisely estimated distribution of a single buyer or several independent and identically distributed buyers given that this estimation is not far away from the true distribution. We use the earth mover's distance to capture the estimation error between those two distributions in terms of both values and their probabilities, i.e., the error in value space given a quantile, and the error in quantile space given a value. We give explicit characterization of the optimal mechanisms for the single buyer setting. For the multi-buyer case, we provide an algorithm that finds an approximately optimal mechanism (FPTAS) among the family of second price mechanisms with a fixed reserve.
Introduction
One of the most important topics in mechanism design is the revenue maximization problem. Optimal mechanisms have been well studied in both single-item setting, following the seminar work of Myerson (1981) , and multi-item setting, see Cai et al. (2012a,b) . There is also a huge literature on approximately optimal simple mechanisms, see Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen (2018) for a detailed discussion. All those papers assume that the seller knows the exact distribution of the buyers. However, according to Harsanyi (1967) , this assumption is hard to realize in practice. To overcome this problem, lots of studies have focused on revenue maximization with weaker assumptions. In Cole and Roughgarden (2014) , they assume that the seller only has access to the samples of the buyers' distributions, and the goal is to maximize the revenue using the distribution reconstructed from the samples. The model in Chen et al. (2018) assumes that the seller has oracle access to the value and quantile information about the true distribution. Similar to the goal of sample complexity, the goal here is to reconstruct the distribution with limited queries. The prior-independent mechanism design model considered in Devanur et al. (2011) adopts an extreme assumption that the seller has no information about the distribution. They assume that the buyers' valuations are independent and identically distributed. All those papers focus on the nature of the imprecision on the prior distribution, which will also be the main focus of our paper.
Our Problem and Results
The seller is given an imprecisely estimated distribution of a single buyer or several i.i.d buyers, and the assumption is that it is within ǫ earth mover's distance to the true distribution. The seller designs a mechanism based on the estimated distribution, while its performance is evaluated with respect to the worst case distribution within ǫ earth mover's distance to the estimated distribution. We want to design the optimal mechanism in this worst case performance metric. This will give a lower bound for any true distribution in that range and we call such mechanism the most robust mechanism.
In section 3, we solve the max-min problem when there is a single buyer. The idea is to write this problem using a linear program, and transform it into its dual form. By analyzing the properties of the dual, we can successfully characterize the optimal robust mechanism. Here, we state the results for continuous distributions informally.
Informal Theorem 1. When there is a single buyer, the allocation x for the optimal mechanism satisfies that ∃a, b:
The formal result are stated in Theorem 1 for discrete distributions. For continuous distribution, we can discretize the support and come up with such mechanism that is arbitrarily close to the optimal. As we show in the above theorem, the optimal mechanism is a randomized mechanism. Moreover, using this characterization, we can bound the gap between the optimal randomized mechanism and the optimal deterministic mechanism for the max-min goal, which is shown in Theorem 3 and 4. In section 4, we first characterize the worst case distribution for the second price mechanism.
Informal Theorem 2. When there are multiple buyers, the worst case distribution for the second price mechanism satisfies that, there exists k, l such that k < l, the density between value k and l is 0, and the distribution outside [k, l] remains the same comparing to the distribution known by the seller.
This result is formally stated in Theorem 5. Using this characterization as a bridge, we are able to further characterize the distribution with minimum revenue for second price mechanism with a fixed reserve. Moreover, in Theorem 6, for Lipschitz continuous distributions with bounded support, we design a FPTAS algorithm for finding the optimal robust reserve for the second price auction when there are multiple buyers. Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) show that by decreasing the theoretical optimal reserve price by a constant factor, the revenue increases in practice. They do not provide theoretical intuition for their result. Our result indicates that one possible reason is that the underlying true distribution is not identical to the distribution known by the seller, and the original theoretical optimal reserve price is not robust with respect to the imprecision of the distribution.
Previous Work on Robust Mechanism Design
There are a number of works studying the robustness of mechanisms at different levels of prior imprecision in both econ literature, e.g., Bergemann and Schlag (2008); Carroll and Segal (2016); Carroll (2017) , and computer science literature, e.g., Cai and Daskalakis (2017) ; Gravin and Lu (2018) . To quantify the imprecision, some may define a distance metric for distributions, and then an imprecise distribution can be characterized as any distribution within a distance of ǫ from the true one. With those imprecise distributions, we can design a max-min game between the seller and the adversarial nature: the seller proposes a mechanism, and then the adversary chooses a distribution with minimum expected revenue generated by that mechanism. The performance of the optimal mechanism is studied under such circumstance. For one dimensional density functions f, f ′ and their corresponding cumulative distributions F, F ′ , we present the informal definition of some metrics used in previous works:
• Earth Mover's distance (First order Wasserstein distance): inf π(x,y)∈Π +∞ 0 +∞ 0 π(x, y)|x − y|dxdy where Π is the set of all the two dimensional distribution whose marginals are respectively f and f ′ .
With these distance metrics, some researches have been conducted on robust mechanisms design. Cai and Daskalakis (2017) studies the revenue guarantee of simple and robust mechanism in multiitem, multi-buyer settings. By sampling from the distribution O(
ǫ 2 ) times, they are able to learn the marginal distribution for each item that is within ǫ TV-distance, with probability at least 1 − δ. In such setting, they also study the upper bound of approximation ratio for simple mechanisms, such as rationed sequential posted price mechanisms or anonymous sequential posted price mechanisms with entry fees. The work of Bergemann and Schlag (2008) focuses on the Prokhorov distance. When there is a single buyer, a single item and a potential ǫ Prokhorov distance between the true prior and the known distribution, the paper examines the properties and the equilibrium of the maxmin game via an implicit function, and they characterize the seller's optimal mechanism as posting a deterministic price.
Most of the distance metrics are chosen for the convenience of computation, while disadvantages of such choices do exist.
• Sensitivity to Distribution: Some distance measures only focus on the errors in probability space, not the errors in value space. For instance, consider two distributions which are 1 and 1 − ǫ respectively with probability 1, where ǫ > 0 is a small constant. Those two distributions should be considered to be close to each other, with a small error in value space. However, the TV distance and Kolmogorov distance between these two distributions both achieve their maximum 1, indicating that a tiny deviation of distributions can bring about a giant variation distances.
• Sensitivity to Structure: Some previous results for certain metrics benefit from the property that there is a distribution which is statistically dominated by all the distributions within certain distance. For Prokhorov distance and Kolmogorov distance, such distributions is to move the the probability of measure ǫ from the highest value to the lowest. For single item settings, the max-min mechanism becomes the optimal mechanism on the dominated distribution due to revenue monotonicity. This property does not hold in general, such as the robustness for the earth mover's distance, and hence their results cannot be generalized for more general settings.
Therefore, proper distance measures should take the errors in value space into consideration, i.e. either there is a small error in estimating the value or the probability of a large error in estimating the value is small. This property is well characterized by the earth mover's distance. Moreover, there does not exist a single distribution that is stochastically dominated by all other distributions within ǫ earth mover's distance to the known distribution. Thus, we cannot exploit the revenue monotonicity of the single item auction. As a result, our mechanism is much more complex than the previous results, in the sense that our mechanism is randomized.
Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider the problem that the seller tries to sell a single indivisible item to the buyers whose values are independently and identically distributed. Let M = {1, . . . , m} denote the set of buyers. For the sake of simplicity, we start with discrete distributions, and we will show how to generalize our results to continuous distributions. For any buyer j ∈ M , his value v j takes from a discrete value set V = {v 0 , . . . , v n }, where v 0 < v 1 < · · · < v n . We assume that the seller knows the set V and a discrete distribution f = (f i ) i∈{0,...,n} , where f i is the probability of value v i . When we consider the continuous distribution, we will use the notation and let f (v) denote the probability density at value v. We denote F as the corresponding cumulative probability function. Note that this is not the true underlying distribution for the buyers. We assume that the error of the distribution is small. We characterize this error using earth mover's distance. To change from f to f ′ , we need to move a possibility measure at least j<i (f j − f ′ j ) from v i to v i−1 or from v i−1 to v i . Therefore, the earth mover's distance between discrete distributions f and f ′ is equivalently defined as
We assume that the true distribution for the buyers is within ǫ earth mover's distance of the known distribution f . That is, the seller knows f and knows that the true distribution
Since both probability density function f and cumulative probability function F uniquely decides a distribution, we also use notations EM D(F, F ′ ), EM D(F, ǫ) for the same meaning.
In this paper, we use M = (x, p) to denote a mechanism, where x = (x j i ) i∈{0,...,n},j∈M is the allocation rule and p = (p j i ) i∈{0,...,n},j∈M is the payment rule. Here x j i is the probability that buyer j gets the item when he bids v i , and p j i is the price that buyer j pays when he bids v i . When there is only one buyer, we will omit the superscription for the allocation and the price without ambiguity.
The goal of the seller is to find a individual rational (IR) incentive compatible (IC) mechanism M to maximize the minimum revenue among all those possible distributions. That is, denoting Rev(M, f ) as the revenue of a IR-IC mechanism M with buyer distribution f , and denoting M as the set of mechanisms we consider for the setting, the goal of the seller is to find a mechanism M * such that
In the rest of this paper, we will show how to achieve this goal when there is only one buyer and the mechanism set M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, or when there are multiple buyers and the mechanism set M is the set of second price mechanisms with fixed reserves. Moreover, for the single buyer case, we start with the assumption that the distribution f known by the seller is regular, i.e. the virtual value
is non-decreasing Myerson (1981) . Note that this does not imply that the true distribution is regular. In fact, this assumption can be removed and we formally discuss it in section 3.1.
Single Buyer Case
When there is a single buyer, the form of the mechanism is simply posting a (randomized) menu to the buyer, and let the buyer choose his favorite entry. In this case, we prove that the mechanism satisfying the max-min goal has a very simple form. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. When there is a single buyer and M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, for any discrete distribution f with support
takes one of the following forms.
For any
, and
In order to solve problem (3), first we transform the problem into a simpler form. According to Devanur et al. (2016) , the revenue of the seller is monotone with respect to statistical dominance. Therefore, we only need to consider the distribution where the probability mass is moved from a high value to low value. Let the probability transferred from value v i to v i−1 be t i . Then the new distribution f ′ satisfies that f ′ i = f i + t i+1 − t i and the earth mover distance between f and f ′ can be written as
Let the allocation and payment rule of a mechanism M be (x, p). We can write (3) as the following explicit mathematical programming:
Fix a feasible pair of variables x, p and focus on the minimization part of the optimization problem (4). Since the term n i=1 p i f i is a constant with respect to t, the minimization problem can be written equivalently into the following form.
We can write its dual form as follows:
Also, we say a vector v dominates u if and only if for any i, v i ≥ u i . According to Myerson's lemma, in a DSIC mechanism, the allocation is non-decreasing. We denote P as the set of all possible payment rules of the IR-IC mechanisms, and we denote Z as the set of all possible z's that are dominated by some p ∈ P . Obviously, P ⊂ Z for every vector dominates itself. By strong duality, the optimal of the primal and the dual are equal. Hence, by substituting the primal problem (5) with the dual problem (6), we can rewrite the original optimization problem (4) equivalently as follows.
To solve problem (7), we are going to reduce it into another problem:
Intuitively, the solution to (8) is the payment rule of an IR-IC mechanism of which expected revenue minus λǫ achieves the maximum and adjacent payments are bounded by a multiple of λ. To show that the the solutions to problem (7) and (8) are the same, we need the following lemma:
is the solution of the optimization problem (7), z ∈ P .
In order to prove the above lemma, we make the following observations. Property 1 . If (λ, z) is the solution to the optimization problem (7), z is non-decreasing.
Proof. Suppose (λ * , z) optimizes problem (7) and there exist i such that z i > z i+1 . By constraint of problem (7), there exists p ′ ∈ P and p ′ dominate z. We construct another vector z * such that z * j = z j , ∀j = i + 1, and
Thus, (λ * , z * ) satisfies all the constraints and z * · f > z · f . Hence we get the contradiction and z is non-decreasing.
Property 2. Let z be a non-decreasing sequence. If there exists p ∈ P such that p dominates z, we have z ∈ P .
Proof. For a non-decreasing sequence z, denoting x as the allocation for the payment p that dominates z, we prove z ∈ P by finding a feasible allocation x ′ for z. For any allocation and payment pair (x, p), it is truthful if and only if
We set x ′ 0 = x 0 . For any i ∈ [n], we set
It is easy to check that x ′ is monotone and it satisfies the truthful condition in inequality 9. We only need to check that x n ≤ 1 and it is individual rational. First, we observe
The first inequality holds because p dominates z, and the maximum is achieved only when z i = p i for any i ≥ 1. By construction that
Thus the allocation x ′ and payment z satisfies individual rationality, and z ∈ P .
Combining Property 1 and 2, Lemma 1 holds. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 1, the solution (λ * , z * ) to problem (8) is the solution to problem (7). Now, we can view z * as the payment rule of a mechanism and let p * i = z * i , β * i = 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, if a mechanism has the same payment rule as z * , it is an optimal mechanism to problem (7). So all we have to do now is find a mechanism that optimizes problem (8), which is the solution to problem (7) as well.
Let z ∈ P and y be the corresponding allocation rule such that for any 1
. By Myerson's Lemma for discrete distributions, we have
Let k be the index that φ k ≥ 0 and ∀i < k, φ i < 0. Fixing y k and λ, by the constraint of problem (8), we have y j − y j−1 =
. In order to maximize the objective, all the above inequalities should be equalities. Similarly, for any i < k,
, 0}, and the equalities should hold to maximize the objective. When λ = 0, we can easily get that for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, y i = y k , which is optimized at y k = 1. This characterization is equivalent to the case 1 in Theorem 1.
When λ > 0, there exist 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ n, such that
Fixing a and b, the allocation y can be uniquely determined by the value y a . Substituting equation 10 and the characterization of variable y back into problem (8), we can get the following optimization problem with y a as a variable.
Since the objective and constraints are linear in λ and y a , the optimum is reached at the boundary of the domain. Moreover, when λ > 0, for the boundary case, y a = 0 or y a = λ(va−v a−1 ) va .
In both cases, we can get that there exist 0 ≤ a ′ ≤ b ′ ≤ n such that λ = 1/(
, and the allocation y takes the following form. The payment z can be computed accordingly.
This characterization is equivalent to the case 2 in Theorem 1. By brute force searching all possible pair of a, b and select the one with highest expected revenue, we find the desired mechanism that maximizes the objective value of problem (7) and (8). Therefore, we have for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, x i = y i , p i = z i and the mechanism that optimizes problem (7) is also an optimal solution for problem (3). Thus finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
Irregular Distribution
In this section, we show the result for the single buyer case even when the prior distribution known by the seller is irregular. First we state the theorem.
Theorem 2. When there is a single buyer and M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, for any continuous distribution
with allocation and payment (x, p) takes the following form: there exist s ≥ 1 and a set { (a 1 , b 1 
Note that given the allocation rule, the payment can be computed using Myerson's payment identity Myerson (1981) . Here, instead of proving that Theorem 2 is correct using duality, we present another intuitive idea to show the correctness of the theorem. This idea will help us have a further understanding of the result. First, we plot the revenue curve of the known distribution, where the x-axis is the quantile of the distribution, i.e., the probability that is larger than or equal to a certain value.
The revenue curve of the known distribution F and the distribution G with minimum revenue.
From the graph, we can easily verify that for any constant ǫ, there exists a unique γ that intersects the distribution at quantiles in set Q = {(q 1 , q ′ 1 ), . . . , (q s , q ′ s )}, and the resulting distribution G satisfies that EM D(G, F ) = ǫ. Letting {(a 1 , b 1 ) , . . . , (a s , b s )} be the value that corresponds to the set Q under distribution F , according to the characterization of the single item optimal Bayesian mechanism Myerson (1981) ; Hartline and Karlin (2007) , the mechanism M * designed in Theorem 2 is optimal for distribution G. Moreover, according to the payment rule defined in Theorem 2, the distribution with minimum revenue is exactly distribution G. Therefore, considering any other mechanism M ′ , we have
and Theorem 2 holds.
Deterministic Mechanism
In real world, the complex randomized algorithm may not be applicable. Instead, people will try to approximate the optimal with simple deterministic mechanisms. When the distribution is known and there is a single item, the deterministic mechanism is indeed optimal. Here in this section, we will show that when the known distribution is within ǫ earth mover's distance of the true distribution, the deterministic mechanism is still a good approximation to the optimal randomized mechanism with respect to the max-min objective. Formally, we have the following theorem. Note that in this section, we do not require the distribution known by the seller is regular.
Theorem 3. When there is a single buyer and M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, for any
For any constant ǫ ≤ R, there exists a deterministic mechanism M such that
Proof. It is obvious that R ≤ OP T (f ), where OP T (f ) is the optimal revenue of f . So we only need to prove that
Note that for distribution f , there exists a simple deterministic mechanism that achieve optimal revenue. Assume that this mechanism posts price a and sells the item when the buyer's value is larger than or equal to a. We assume the item is sold with probability b. Clearly, ab = OP T (f ). Suppose we have a new mechanism that posts price x ≤ a − ǫ b . Note that since x ≥ 0, ǫ ≤ ab. Next we bound the probability Pr v∼f ′ ∈EM D(f,ǫ) (v ≥ x). Note that the probability of v ≥ x is at least the probability of v ≥ a in distribution f minus the probability that can be moved from above a to below x. Hence, we have
Therefore, min
By optimizing x and set it as a − aǫ b , we have
Thus finishes the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. When there is a single buyer and M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, for any constant ǫ ≤ R, there exists a distribution f such that for any deterministic mechanism M, letting
Proof. Consider the equal revenue distribution on support [1, h] . Applying the result in Theorem 1, we can calculate R ≈ 1 − ǫ ln h . When we set h → ∞, we know that the maximin revenue approaches 1. Now we consider the deterministic mechanism which posts price x ≤ h. We divide the analysis into 2 cases: x < 1 and x ≥ 1. When x ≥ 1, suppose b is the value such that exactly the probability between x and b is moved to below x. Then, we have
When ǫ is small, the revenue of posting price x is
2 . When x < 1, also let b be the value such that exactly the probability between x and b is moved to below x. Then, we have
When ǫ is small, we have x ≈ b − ǫb b−1 , and the revenue of posting price x is
, which is increasing with respect to b. However, the maximum value of b is reached when x approaches 1. Therefore, the maximum revenue is achieved in case 1 when x ≥ 1, and min
The exact form of the inequality in the statement of Theorem 4 can be similarly derived by setting the known distribution f as the equal revenue distribution on [R, ∞).
Multiple Buyer Case
In this section, we consider the problem where the seller tries to sell a single item to m i.i.d. buyers. Note that for the multi-buyer case, the max-min problem is not convex. Therefore, we cannot apply the duality approach as in the single buyer case to have a characterization for the distribution with minimum revenue. In this section, we will focus on a special class of mechanisms, second price mechanism with reserves, and as we will show later, the characterization for this set of mechanisms is not trivial. Moreover, in the single item environment, when the distributions are i.i.d. and regular, the second price mechanism with a fixed reserve is optimal for revenue maximization. Therefore, it is nature to conjecture that this simple mechanism still has approximately optimal performance in our robust setting. We leave the characterization of the approximation ratio of the second price mechanism with fixed reserve as an open problem. In this section, we will show how to efficiently compute the optimal robust reserve price for the second price auction. In our following analysis, we assume that the known distribution f is a Lipschitz continuous distribution. Note that for any distribution f ′ ∈ EM D(f, ǫ), f ′ may not be Lipschitz continuous.
Second Price Mechanism
Before stating our computational result, we start with the characterization of the distribution within ǫ earth-mover's distance that generates the minimum revenue for the second price auction M. This characterization will help us understand the minimization part of our max-min problem for the multi-buyer case, which eventually will help us design the algorithms for finding the optimal reserve in the robust setting.
In second price auction, the expected revenue is the expected value of the second highest buyer. Intuitively, the distribution that generates minimum revenue is the one that differs from the known distribution only in the quantile corresponding to the second highest buyer. We formalize this idea and prove it in Theorem 5. 
There exists
Proof. First note that if EM D(G, F ) < ǫ, by simply moving some probability from higher value to lower value, by revenue monotonicity, the expected revenue will decrease. Therefore, we have EM D(G, F ) = ǫ.
Note that the probability that the second price is larger than a value v is 1 minus the probability that all value is below value v and the probability that only one value is above value v. That is,
Therefore, the expected revenue of running second price mechanism M with distribution f ′ is
Since we require that distribution f ′ ∈ EM D(f, ǫ), we know that distribution f ′ satisfies the constraints that
Moreover, since moving the distribution from a lower value to a higher value will not reduce the revenue. In order to find the distribution that generates minimum revenue, we can assume without loss of generality that F (v) ≤ F ′ (v), ∀v. Next we show that with this assumption, minimizing equation 12 subject to constraint 13 is equivalent to minimizing equation 12 subject to the following constraint, with a changing of variable F * .
Let J * (y) be the measure of the set {v|v > 0 and F * (v) ≤ y} and let F ′ (v) = inf{y|J * (y) ≥ v}. Note that in constraint 13, F ′ (∞) = 1, F ′ (v) is monotone non-decreasing and the measure of the set {v|v ≥ 0 and F ′ (v) ≤ y} equals J * (y). Moreover, let ψ(x) = 1 + (m − 1)x m − mx m−1 and according to Lebesgue integration,
Let J(y) be the measure of the set {v|v > 0 and F (v) ≤ y}. Since for any v, F * (v) ≥ F (v), we have {v|v > 0 and F * (v) ≤ y} ⊆ {v|v > 0 and F (v) ≤ y}, which indicates that for any value v, J * (v) ≤ J(v), and F ′ (v) ≤ F (v). Finally, we show that
and the constructed distribution F ′ satisfies all the constraints in (13). Therefore, with the constraint F (v) ≤ F ′ (v), we can neglect the monotonicity constraint of F ′ (v). Now we are ready to prove the part (2) of the theorem. Let v ′ be the smallest number such that
Assuming for contradiction that that G(l) > G(k), according to the construction of v ′ , there exists a value s ∈ (k, l) and a sufficiently small ǫ ′ such that
We note that δ > 0. Construct a new "distribution"
We note that G ′ may not be a real distribution since it may not be monotone. But we have gotten rid of the monotonicity constraint. It is easy to verify that G ′ satisfies the required constraint as our choice of δ. Now we define
Obviously, D(0) = 0. Moreover, letting ǫ * be a constant such that 0 < ǫ * < ǫ ′ , when δ = 0, we have
Proof of Theorem 6. By Lemma 2, we can focus on computing the minimum revenue for a fixed reserve price r. To begin with, we explicitly express the revenue of a distribution in terms of its cumulative probability function. For simplicity, we assume without loss of generality that a buyer can only get the item if he bids strictly larger than the reserve. Then, we can rewrite the expected revenue of the second price with reserve is First, let g arg min f ′ ∈EM D(f,ǫ) Rev(M, f ′ ) denote the worst distribution for the second price mechanism with reserve M, and G is its corresponding cumulative distribution. Note that it is meaningless to move the distribution below the reserve r. Therefore, for any v ≤ r, G(v) = F (v). Moreover, similar to Theorem 5, we have EM D(G, F ) = ǫ. Assuming that k is the smallest number such that G(k) ≥ max{G(r), With these characterization, we know that it is sufficient to compute the value G r , k and l to determine the distribution G. Note that those three variable satisfies the constraint that EM D(G, F ) = ǫ. Therefore, it is sufficient for us to determine k and l.
First, we discretize the cumulative probability space [0, 1] 
Conclusion and Future Direction
We characterized the optimal robust mechanism for single-buyer case and the optimal robust reserve price for the second price auction for the multi-buyer case. However, many interesting questions are left open. For starters, it would be exciting to bound the gap between the worst case performance of the second price mechanism with a fixed reserve and the optimal robust mechanism. Moreover, we do not have any characterization of the optimal robust mechanism for this max-min goal when there are more than one buyer. For this problem, we conjecture that when the known distribution is regular, second price mechanism with randomized reserves is optimal. Another interesting direction is to investigate this problem in the multi-parameter setting. The revenue maximization problem for multi-parameter setting is notoriously hard. So, a good starting point would be analyzing the performance of the simple constant approximation mechanisms for this case.
